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**Multilingualism, Intelligibility and Hegemony**

**Abstract:**

The various advocates of ‘global English’ herald its ability to promote mobility, travel and greater international and global connections through increased communicability. From political theorists (especially normative liberal political theory) to English as a Lingua Franca researchers through mainstream accounts of ‘global English’ (e.g. David Crystal, David Northrup, etc…) to post-structuralist critical theorists (e.g. Pennycook, Canagarajah), ‘global English’ is portrayed as a possible solution to so-called ‘intelligibility’ problems posed by linguistic diversity. While many advocates of ‘global English’ claim to value multilingualism, they most often mobilize implicitly or explicitly some concept of ‘intelligibility’ that ‘global English’ supposedly provides more efficiently, effectively or without a massive use of resources. This paper argues that despite some attempts to ‘make space’ or account for the symbolic importance of languages and their roles in identity, these diverse positions are premised on what Stephen May has labelled ‘public monolingualism’ that presupposes that linguistic diversity as fundamentally a barrier to communication (May 2015). Drawing on a diverse set of alternative philosophical conceptions of language, I argue that ‘intelligibility’ functions as an inherently reductive concept that fails to take into account questions of language standardization and language prestige – two central elements of linguistic hegemony.

**Multilingualism, Intelligibility and Hegemony**

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**Introduction: Intelligibility in Relation to Hegemony**

 What is ‘intelligibility’? This is a deep philosophical question, and I’m not going to try to answer it today. Instead, the main point of this paper is that an unproblematic notion of ‘intelligibility’ or ‘successful communication’ often plays a central role in critical language and language policy scholarship and especially work focusing on the role of ‘global English.’ I want to illustrate how ‘intelligibility’ is often posited in a manner that requires it to be separated from power relationships. So it is the simple assumption that language is fundamentally about communicating or making ourselves or our ideas intelligible to others that I am calling ‘intelligibility.’ My alternative position is that ‘intelligibility’ should always be placed explicitly within relations of hegemony.[[1]](#endnote-1) But what I find in much current research is the exact opposite. ‘Intelligibility’ is the foil to hegemony or functions as the reason why we don’t have to take it into account.

 I am a little hesitant to raise the concept of ‘hegemony’ for several reasons. Much of my work has been on Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist communist leader who was thrown in jail illegally by Mussolini and the fascists in 1926. And in his very influential Prison Notebooks, he developed a concept of ‘hegemony’ in order to analyze the intricate relations between what he understood as ‘common sense’ or popular opinion, culture, religion and politics more strictly speaking. In this sense, he was interested in the concept of ‘hegemony’ to figure out the demise of the socialist and communist movements in Italy that seemed to have so much promise after WWI. Of course, very quickly in the early 1920s, the potentiality of the workers’ struggle collapsed and gave way to the rise of fascism. Gramsci understood fascism as a movement that while clearly using violence and the threats of violence had risen to power with considerable support among key sectors of the Italian population. So unlike how the term ‘hegemony’ had been used in Russia by both the Bolsheviks and social democrats, Gramsci used it to understand his enemies. But he also saw ‘hegemony’ as a concept that could be used to show a way forward, to provide a model for how progressive, Marxist movements could resist and overturn fascism, even if his prognosis was that this would be a longer struggle. This is what many people label ‘counter-hegemony’ – a concept Gramsci never used and there is good reason to see it as a mistaken label for what he advocated. But the larger point is that Gramsci used ‘hegemony’ as an analytic concept to understand both those movements that he rejected for normative reasons and the types of politics he advocated. Gramsci’s attention to culture, as well as institutions, accounts significantly for his influence across many academic disciplines, from international relations and political economy to literature and cultural studies, from the Subaltern Studies historians of India to activists in Latin America and elsewhere.

 My work on Gramsci has focused on the role of language politics in his writings including his development of hegemony (Ives 2004a, Ives 2004b). Gramsci studied linguistics at the University of Turin and maintained a deep interest in Italian (and global) language politics throughout his life. There is significant evidence that much of his development of the concept of hegemony drew explicitly from the Italian linguistics he studied at university. Hegemony was one of several linguistic concepts being used to analyze how different languages, differing words and grammatical forms were being adopted into various languages especially among Italian vernaculars. Indeed one prominent Italian scholar, Franco Lo Piparo, argues that all Gramsci’s original contributions to Marxism comes from linguistics (Lo Piparo 2010 [1987]), a claim I reject, but it makes an important point.

**Uses of ‘Hegemony’ in Language Scholarship**

 From this perspective, I am concerned about how language scholars use ‘hegemony.’ Robert Phillipson’s classic work, *Linguistic Imperialism*, from 1992, invoked Gramsci and his concept of hegemony in a way that have led many to see hegemony as almost synonymous or at least closely associated with imperialism. On the other side, so to speak, hegemony is often invoked as the ‘organization of consent’ or as Jan Blommaert and his co-authors/co-editors put it, “hegemony-as-consent” (Blommaert et al 2003). This is from the introduction to a special issue of the journal, *Pragmatics¸*focusing on the concept of hegemony in applied and socio-linguistics. The introduction explains that hegemony is needed “because with the rhetoric of choice, the movement away from class-based political mobilization, the epistemological shifts, and the ongoing ‘critique’ of traditional forms of authority, the contemporary era also presents us with a widely-acknowledged intensification of social inequality within and across nations” (Blommaert et al. 2003, p.3). And yet they also point out that most of the contributions to their special issue focus on cultural hegemony as ‘hegemony-as-consent’ but insist that this is not totally divorced from issues of coercion, force and either the threat of violence or its practice.

 So my project here is not to sketch out a comprehensive theory of ‘hegemony’ for linguists or language policy scholars. But rather I want to contribute one piece, perhaps a small piece, to such a larger endeavour. This smaller piece involves debunking or deconstructing the role that the concept of ‘intelligibility’ or ‘successful communication’ plays in obscuring the hegemony and especially the ever present existence of power relationships that always involve at very least the threat of coercion.

 So I start with a quote from Gramsci, although a quote that does not contain the word, hegemony:

“Besides the ‘immanent grammar’ in every language, there is also in reality (i.e. even if not written) a ‘normative’ grammar (or more than one). This is made up of reciprocal monitoring, reciprocal teaching and reciprocal ‘censorship’ expressed in such questions as ‘What did you mean to say?’, ‘What do you mean?’, ‘Make yourself clearer’, etc… and in mimicry and teasing.” Antonio Gramsci, 1935. Q29 §2 (Gramsci 1985, p.180).[[2]](#endnote-2)

In this passage written by Gramsci in the last substantive notebook he started in prison, two years before his death, he makes a very important point that I argue fundamentally challenges one of the key assumptions and concepts that underpins much of the contemporary work on ‘global English’ today. Of course, the idea of normative grammar is usually traced back to the Port-Royal Grammar of 1662 and understood at the normative set of rules that a speaker *should follow* to speak a language properly. It is referenced by both Noam Chomsky and Ferdinand de Saussure as a precursor to their approaches to language as a structure. Like many others, Gramsci distinguishes ‘normative grammar’ from spontaneous or immanent grammar, those rules or patterns we follow when using language without knowing them. So this quote is interesting (and the parenthetical comment about normative grammar including the non-written grammars) because it expands the standard conception of normative grammar.

 There are other points to draw from this section, but I will just focus on one key one concerning the relations of power among interlocutors as being inseparable from questions of ‘intelligibility,’ or whether a given utterance is ‘successful’ in that the speaker communicated their message to the listener. Who gets to decide and demarcate what is ‘intelligible’ and what is not. When and how is ‘communication’ deemed ‘successful’ and is it always a symmetrical judgement? Gramsci continues in this passage to discuss the differences between the situation of those who have migrated from the country to the city and are pressured to adopt the urban language, and those who remain in the country but adopt urban language as a matter of prestige and to distinguish themselves. These points will become more significant below when I discuss the work of Suresh Canagarajah.

 I do not have the time in this paper to connect his development here of ‘normative grammar’ to ‘spontaneous grammar,’ common sense, the differing functions of intellectuals, civil society, passive revolution and Gramsci’s other key concepts (see Ives 2004b). But rather I want to use it as a launching point to consider the question of ‘intelligibility.’

**Obscuring Hegemony with ‘Intelligibility’**

 One can easily see that this passage of Gramsci’s provides a very different understanding of the contexts in which language is deemed intelligible from that of, to take one example, Phillippe van Parijs. He describes what he labels the “maxi-min dynamics” where decisions about which language to speak in a multilingual setting. Van Parjis argues that “What you and your conversation partners will systematically tend to ask yourself is which language is best known by the member of your audience who knows it least well” (Van Parijs 2011, p.14). This is what he means by ‘maxi-min.’ With little further explanation, this dynamic assumes a conception of what Van Parjis describes as ‘communication’ but is more or less synonymous with what I am calling ‘intelligibility’ is central to his theory of ‘linguistic justice.’ Rather than delving deeper into complex political relations, Van Parijs succinctly delimits “deviations” from this maxi-min norm including ‘didactic’ and ‘symbolic reasons’ for people in multilingual situations to not follow his maxi-min norm. He then argues that “It is hard to imagine that a power relationship, so defined, can trump the maxi-min logic” (Van Parijs, p.19). He does admit that “the wealthy will tend to be more often on the comfortable side than the poor, the bosses more often than the workers, the powerful more often than the powerless, the loved more often than the loving. However, the extent to which this will involve departure from the maxi-min criterion should not be exaggerated. For the effective exercise of power generally requires effective communication” (Van Parijs, p.20).

 I suppose I could summarize my argument as exactly disobeying Van Parijs’ decree and exaggerating the extent to which questions of power not only trump his mini-max logic, but is the much more common situation. Indeed, I would argue that it would be a rare case when anything like this ‘maxi-min’ dynamic functions free of questions of power. But today I don’t want to spend any more time critiquing Van Parijs, as I have done that elsewhere. I just want to connect the implicit notion of ‘intelligibility’ that he assumes seems to exclude power relations in a manner I see in other approaches to global English.

**The ‘Translanguaging’ Scholarship:**

**Rejecting Standardized Languages and Languages as Systems**

 So I’d like to focus on a different literature, one that presents itself as more critical and a perspective that one may have thought would not be so quick to be reductionist when it comes to power relations, and in many ways is not reductionist. The literature I’m talking about is the critical linguists influenced by post-structuralism who invoke the concepts of ‘languaging’ and especially ‘translanguaging’ and ‘translingual practice.’ These concepts are often used in conjunction with ‘superdiversity,’ ‘metrolinguistics,’ ‘dynamic bilingualism’ and the like. Here I include the work of Suresh Canagarajah, Alistair Pennycook, Sinfree Makoni, Ofelia Garcia, Li Wei and many others. There are of course differences amongst them. But they all offer a very deep challenge to the idea that languages are structures. They draw from post-structuralism significantly but the theorist that seems to garner their attention the most is Pierre Bourdieu. And it is his idea of ‘practice’ that both Canagarajah and Pennycook explicitly invoke at length. What all these scholars have in common is a radical rejection of standard languages or national languages as if they were natural, rational, or based in some unhistorical fixity. As Pennycook writes, “the notion of discrete, bounded languages becomes very dubious, since languages are always mixed, hybrid and drawing on multiple resources” (Pennycook 2010, p.129). One point that most of them take from this is that standard languages are “always emergent” or as Gramsci argues using his concept, normative grammar, they are always a ‘choice’ a “political act” (Gramsci 1985, p.182, Q29 §2), or what I would call a political project.

 This point is certainly not unique to those critical language scholars who invoke ‘translingual practice’ or ‘translanguaging.’ And this is a point that I fully agree with and see a lot of value, including for language policy scholarship. But much other scholarship also makes this point, for example historians of nationals like Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and others (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1990). They show how the very idea of a standardized national language is a political creation that historically went hand in hand with the development of the modern European nation-state. Nevertheless, I would argue that sometimes language policy scholars do need to fully accept this position and its ramifications.

 But the critical language scholars go further. Or rather, they add to this point what I take to be a rather different point. Pennycook argues, “Once we accept that language is a social practice, it becomes clear that it is not language[-]form that governs the speakers of the language but rather the speakers that *negotiate* what possible language forms they want to use for what purpose” (Pennycook 2010, p.129, emphasis added). Or Canagarajah’s version is, “meaning doesn’t arise from a common grammatical system or norm, but through negotiation practices in local situations” (Canagarajah 2013, p.7). Or again as Canagarajah summarizes his perspective “…that it is practices and social negotiations that generate meaning out of fluid and hybrid codes” as opposed to other approaches that “assume languages have their own independent systems” (Canagarajah 2014, p.89). This focus on negotiation in individual contexts as more important than – and as exclusionary of – any structural approach is central to Pennycook and Canagarajah’s pushing well past the position that all standard languages are political projects. As Pennycook writes, “Rather than suggesting therefore that different languages have been invented within particular contexts, this position [the one he takes] argues that the very notion of languages themselves is an invention…. There are no languages” (Pennycook 2007, p.98). Again, there seem to be two distinguishable points here. One is not only that standard languages are political projects that are on-going and never fully achieved. But the second, separate contention is that these standard language projects are never even partially or substantially attained because the very idea of languages as structures or systems of meaning making is a *myth*. What we had understood as languages, systems or structures of lexical, phonic and grammatical rules and relations, are really merely unsystematised linguistic resources or practices that we draw on to communicate.

 Now much can be said about these arguments, especially in terms of the philosophy of language and its history. But today I want to focus on the implications for political analysis and language policy scholarship. First off, it makes sense that these ideas are coming to the fore now, or in the last few decades often understood as the era of ‘globalization’ involving increased movement of peoples, goods and services across the globe but also increased communications, developments that I would argue are best analyzed as part of the processes of the transformations of global capitalism. And this has of course gone hand in hand in changes to nation-states and their practices including language policies.[[3]](#endnote-3) Indeed, I would argue that this translanguaging research is very important precisely due to the lack of serious grappling with the rise of global English in the mountains of literature on globalization that either ignores language or deals with it very superficially (see Ives 2010).

**Negotiating Meaning**

 Thus, I am fascinating by some of the empirical work being conducted including by Cangarajah. One of these projects involves 65 interviews with skilled professionals originally from sub-Saharan Africa now living in the US, the UK and Australia. Canagarajah’s research team asked these informants not only questions about what we might call language ideology, but also very practical questions about their communication strategies. Canagarajah explains, “What enables my informants to achieve meaning, despite the fact that they all start with their own codes, is their openness to negotiate on equal terms. Though they understand that in certain contexts the norms of certain participants enjoy more status, they expect everyone to be open to co-constructing meaning” (Canagarajah 2014, p.86). He is very clear that it is ‘intelligibility’ or ‘communicative success’ that his empirical work demonstrates among multilingual migrants who are quick to switch back and forth among different languages or linguistic resources (Canagarajah 2013, p.38). Canagarajah then analyzes differing strategies in these negotiations, including clarification, repair, confirmation, ‘make it normal’ and ‘let-it-pass.’ I will come back to this last one, ‘let-it-pass’ (see Frith 1996).

 Another one of Canagarajah’s informants explains that on occasion he has to resort to “a little bit of educating” his interlocutors about the diversity of language norms in multilingual contexts, but that this often takes too much time so usually he resorts to “patience and tact” (Canagarajah 2014, p.87). I have no doubt that immigrants for whom English is not their first language do exercise much patience and tact as well as educating native English speakers about diversity, but this is precisely because of the structural power inequalities involved. In documenting this and advocating it along with a severe critique of languages as systems would seem to severely underestimate the continuing role of power exercised by those linguistic structures.

 Now on one level, I find this research fascinating and important. And I endorse the ideal that the even more advantaged Western professionals in this language negotiations try to adopt what I see as these utopian goals of openness and being directed towards mutual communication and co-construction of meaning. But it feels to me very much like the debates in the 1980s around Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ which he then retracted.

 Moreover, what we have here is Canagarajah making an explicit argument that the progressive move that can make the situation of those with less power better is the replacement of the rules of grammar to “guarantee meaning” in favour of the well-meaning generosity of the more powerful interlocutors to negotiate ‘as if’ the discussion were an even playing field and the only goal, or the over-riding goal, is ‘intelligibility’ or ‘communicative success.

 This analysis seems to be premised on an individualization of structural power asymmetry. So while it is different and *perhaps* preferable to the type of position advocated by supposedly progressive scholars like Thomas Pogge that endorse solely language policies that are ‘best for the child’ in terms of their individual financial success without looking at the larger cultural and political context along with the severe psychological and cultural loses involved (see Pogge 2003; and Ives 2009 for a critique), it seems to me ultimately similar. By focusing on ‘languaging’ instead of ‘languages’ the structural analysis of power relations drops out of consideration. The conceptual tools are not there. Not surprisingly, I think Gramsci provides precisely such tools, not only with his conception of ‘hegemony’ but his entire framework for addressing language politics.

 Moreoever, at the edges of Canagarajah’s analysis he seems to recognize or at least exhibit this questionable role of ‘intelligibility’ in his approach. Commenting on one of his informants who insists on the importance of learning one’s “own language” in addition to English, he notes, “there is a paradox in insisting on one’s difference, acknowledging the interlocutor’s difference, and still achieving intelligibility.” But he continues, the skilled migrants he is studying are able to “deal with this paradox effectively in their strong ethic of collaboration” (Canagarajah 2014, p.95). So it is the non-native English speakers who have to deal with this, and negotiate, including using tact, patience or educating their interlocutors. This seems to me a classic case of a systemic paradox caused by the contradictions of global capitalism that narrowly constrains the conditions of migration including increasing language testing in England and a growing English-Only Movement in the US. And as is often the case, it is the conditions of subalternity include coping with such paradoxes, not those of the dominant. Canagarajah’s approach does very little to grapple with such causes but instead asks the individual skilled migrants to absorb, deal with and negotiate such paradoxes. And it all seems to hinge upon the need to communicate to create intelligibility.

 Even more intriguing in terms of an unacknowledged glance into the limits of ‘intelligibility’ here is Canagarajah’s use of Alan Frith’s discussion from his 1996 article concerning the strategy of ‘let it pass’ (Frith 1996). Frith is arguing that the methodological approach of Conversation Analysis has hitherto focused solely on native speakers but can and should be applied to non-native speakers and their multilingual strategies of communication. In his analysis that is aimed at showing how conversations are structured and organized, he notes speakers often fail to understand their interlocutor, but rather than interrupting and asking for clarification (cf. the quote from Gramsci), they ‘let it pass’ assuming that as the conversation progressed they could figure out the intended meaning (Frith 1996, p.243). Canagarajah not only notes that his informants discuss this conversation strategy, but that some insist it is a requirement of cooperation and negotiation. He quotes an informant as saying, “If someone asks me to repeat myself, I feel offended and slighted; it’s as if someone is questioning my command of the language... It makes me think that they are reminding me that I am a foreigner and I don’t talk like them” (in Canagarajah 2013, p.165). Another informant makes this more explicit when he explains, “Even on occasions when you have *genuinely* not understood what someone has said, you just let it pass, you follow it up with an email just to be sure… “(Canagarajah 2014, pp.95-96, emphasis added). This point seems to echo that of Gramsci’s that I quoted at the outset. But without any conception of ‘normative grammar’ and a total eradication of language as a system or structure, it seems that the power relationships cannot be adequately understood or addressed.

 Canagarajah presents this ‘let-it-pass’ principle as a strategy for negotiating meaning. But he admits that is comes into play when the other strategies like clarification or repetition have failed. But the entire framework sets these up as ‘strategies’ used to ‘negotiate’ successful communication or mutual ‘intelligibility.’[[4]](#endnote-4)

 Now Canagarajah seems to anticipate my reaction. He states, “All this doesn’t mean that my informants don’t acknowledge the reality of power. They do, but they treat it as negotiable.” “My informants employ suitable strategies to persuade their interlocutors to adopt an openness to negotiating difference” (Canagarajah 2014, p.86). Now this is very interesting, because when introducing this research project, he admits that “It might be argued that skilled migrants belong to the educated middle class and cannot be treated as comparable to other multilinguals and migrants. But he argues that these factors are “mediated” by other factors such as ethnicity, race and language identity, and they are at a “relative disadvantage in Western professional contexts.” He thus notes that more research needs to be done on unskilled migrants, but that there is an underlying similarity in the strategies and negotiations they practice (Canagarajah 2014, pp.81-2).

 So on one hand, as a scholar focused on pedagogy and how people use and learn languages in different contexts, there is a lot of important analysis here. And Canagarajah draws many practical insights concerning ELT instruction. The problem, that point where the power relations of hegemony are obscured, is when he extends this analysis beyond this scope. Alan Frith describes his approach to Conversation Analysis by asking, “…what kind of, and how much, anomalous and marked usage can be tolerated by participants before intersubjective meaning is rendered impractical.” But he then rules this question beyond the scope of the article (Frith 1996, p.247). Gramsci’s point, one echoed by Canagarajah’s informants, is that these are not formal questions. There can be no formal, objective analysis of transcripts of conversations that determines abstractly the point at which ‘intelligibility’ breaks down. ‘Intelligibility’ cannot act as a guarantee of cooperation and thus of communication that has transcended power inequalities. But rather the question “What did you mean?” “Make yourself clearer” are both evidence of ‘failure’ to communicate and the imposition of a normative grammar. If you are being interviewed for a job, you will be wise to be much more thoughtful about when you ask for clarification because you don’t understand.

**Conclusion**

 In addition to this burgeoning field of ‘translanguaging’ and ‘translingual practice’ we also know that many of the standard findings about language practices among immigrants has changed in the last few decades. Research for example on Italian immigrants in the US has questioned the older findings that by the third generation language shift is almost complete and the children often don’t even understand Italian. Looking at ‘forth wave’ Italian immigration in an era when travel back to Italy and contacts with Italian relatives and friends is much easier and affordable along with differing issues of ‘prestige’ have led to much greater retention of the immigrant language in the home (see Fellin 2014). This of course changes the children of immigrants’ relation to English that is more ambiguous in terms of whether or not it is their ‘native’ language. Again, if we take the historical work of Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm and others concerning the role of language standardization in nation-state formation, we need to connect these newer trends back to issues of political identity. But we also have to take heed of the massive increase in non-Anglophone countries devoting significant resources to teaching English in national school systems. And we need to pay attention to how they teach it, if it is being taught in the old model of a ‘foreign language,’ or is it taught through a medium of instruction as an 'international lingua franca’ or more specifically for particular vocational purposes.[[5]](#endnote-5) I know I am preaching to the converted, but these are topics that Political Science, Sociology and the Social Sciences in general have payed insufficient attention to. And critical language scholars including Canagarajah and others of the ‘translanguaging’ school are conducting valuable research into these questions that are neglected by other fields. Nevertheless, their findings seem to me much less significant if they are derived through a theoretical model that separates ‘intelligibility’ from questions of hegemony.

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1. My argument here begins from a presumption. One is a point made by Ludwig Wittgenstein when discussing the concept of a ‘game’ as in his famous ‘language-game.’ He asks, “Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?” (Wittgenstein 1953, Note 71, p.34). In other words, meaning that which we want to convey to our interlocutor, is often not the sort of thing that is required to be sharp and exact. Sometimes, the demand for greater clarity is the requirement not of the person making the original utterance, but the receiver. Another way of putting this is perhaps overly anecdotal, but relates more specifically to multilingualism and language learning. And it is that feeling I have when I return to, as a ‘native-English speaker’ to a monolingual English public space after having spent time somewhere where I have struggled in learning and using the dominant non-English language. So it is as if after struggling to understand the conversations that are going on around me, and being unsuccessful and attributing it to my insufficient language skills, I then realize how much misunderstanding and non-understanding accompanies all language usage. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. For a discussion of how Gramsci develops a dialectical relationship between the concepts of ‘normative grammar’ and ‘spontaneous grammar’ that combine to create a linguistic theory of hegemony, see Ives 2015, Ives 2010 and Ives 2004b. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. But even though a historical framework is crucial here, it is important to note that one of the few points on which Canagarajah distinguishes himself from the other scholars of ‘translanguaging’ or ‘translingual practice’ is that he insists there is nothing new, it is neither a urban or a late modern phenomenon. Rather “I think of this orientation as having a long tradition in precolonial and non-Western communities” (Canagarajah 2014, p.79). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. The metaphor of ‘strategy’ is of course an interesting one in that one strategizes to achieve an assumed goal, and there seems to be no indication by Canagarajah that there is any other goal than successful communication. The idea that one interlocutor may be more interested in asserting their status or expressing their perhaps racist frustration with immigration policy is diminished by the mobilization of the metaphor of strategy. Even more interesting is the metaphor of ‘negotiation’ – a word originally related to business transaction but in the 18th century used relating to travelling and circumventing obstacles. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. This is the topic of a current research project I am conducting with Eve Haque and Jeff Bale documenting the increase in English teaching in non-Anglophone countries worldwide since the turn of the 21st century. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)